End-to-end test against the canonical Comet daemon
(comet 1.2.1, both bbsnode2 and a local instance from
build/linux/comet) surfaced three wire-level mismatches.
fpc-comet now talks the existing daemon's protocol exactly:
1) BOTH sides emit NPKT_INITACK. My driver only had
the inbound (answerer) sending INITACK. The existing
daemon waits for the originator's INITACK after
sending its own; without it the answerer hangs in
its post-INIT wait loop and times out (TimeoutSecs).
SendOurInitAck now fires on the outbound side too,
after authentication completes.
2) Transfer-phase frame routing widened. The peer can
race ahead and send transfer frames (FINFO end-of-
batch, FINFOACK, etc.) before we've fully transitioned
out of cmpAuth. Driver now routes transfer-typed
frames to the xfer engine in any post-auth phase
(cmpAuth / cmpKeyExchange / cmpTransfer / cmpShutdown)
instead of dropping them with "unhandled frame in
phase 3" warnings.
3) TComFsProvider.NextOutbound now computes SHA-256 of
each outbound file before returning the TCometSendItem.
Previously left Item.SHA256 as zeros, which the receiver
compared against its own freshly-computed hash and
correctly reported "SHA-256 mismatch" -- the bytes
transferred fine, the hash advertised in FINFO didn't.
Added HashFileSHA256 helper.
example_outbound also takes:
- CM_AKA env var for outbound local AKA (e.g. "1:213/725")
- CM_PRIVKEY env var for ED25519 private-key seed (hex)
- CM_LOG=trace for verbose diagnostics
- CM_REQUEST="*.txt" to FREQ files from peer
- CM_LIST="*" to LSTREQ a listing
- File argument now optional (handshake-only is allowed)
Validated against bbsnode2 (1:213/721, FreeBSD x64,
unmodified canonical Comet daemon code at port 26638) AND
against a local Linux build of the same code:
bbsnode2 dial: ED25519 verified, 82-byte file accepted
+ EOF acked, clean cmpDone, byte-identical
landing in inbound dir.
local dial: NOPWD path, same end-to-end success.
12 unit tests still pass; all 7 cross-targets clean.
That closes the wire-format gap. fpc-comet v0.1.0 is
interop-validated against the canonical implementation.
examples/example_outbound + example_inbound are working
reference consumers using TComTcpTransport + TComFsProvider.
Verified end-to-end on real TCP sockets with both auth paths:
NOPWD (no password configured on either side):
outbound -> auth: NOPWD ; inbound -> authenticated as NOPWD
(capability) ; HELLO.TXT lands in unsecure dir.
Plain password (CM_PASSWORD=SecretPwd on outbound,
same configured on inbound):
outbound -> auth: plain ; inbound -> authenticated as
plain-password ; OnPostAuth fires with auth=4 ; routing
sets InboundOverrideDir -> secure ; HELLO.TXT lands in
secure dir. Byte-identical receive both paths.
Three protocol-correctness fixes that came out of the
end-to-end testing:
1) NOPWD signalling. cm.driver was sending the literal
string "-" in the INIT Password field for NOPWD -- a
BinkP convention I borrowed by mistake. The existing
Comet daemon has always used the COPT_NOPWD capability
bit + an empty Password string. fpc-comet now matches
that convention exactly; this is an interop bug fix,
not a protocol change.
2) Outbound credential plumbing. TCometSessionConfig grows
a Password field. cm.driver.BuildOurInit puts that into
the INIT Password when Direction = cmDirOutbound and
the field is non-empty; everything else sends empty.
3) OnPostAuth + InboundOverrideDir. cm.driver now invokes
OnPostAuth once auth resolves (and before INITACK on the
inbound side), threads the InboundDir override into a
per-session FInboundOverrideDir, and exposes it via
InboundOverrideDir to cm.xfer, which passes it to
provider.OpenForReceive as the OverrideDir argument.
This wires the secure / unsecure routing pattern the
examples demonstrate.
ResolveAuth was rewritten to mirror the existing daemon's
intent:
- outbound: trusts answerer's INITACK (existing daemon
pattern), sets AuthMethod for telemetry based on its
own configured credential + negotiated COPT_NOPWD.
- inbound: plain password match wins ; otherwise NOPWD
accepted only if (no per-node password configured)
AND COPT_NOPWD negotiated ; otherwise auth fails.
All 4 unit tests still pass; all 7 cross-targets clean.
